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Reuschlein Lecture
STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING: VICTIMS, VIOLATORS AND
REMEDIES-INCLUDING AN ANALOGY TO FRAUD IN THE
SALE OF A USED CAR WITH A GENERIC DEFECT*
WILLIAM K.S. WANG**
I. INTRODUCTION
S TOCK market insider trading is buying or selling a publicly traded
stock based on information that is both nonpublic' and material. 2
This Article will address the following four questions:
* This Article is adapted from my Reuschlein Lecture held on April 23, 1999
at the Villanova University School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Mark
Sargent and the faculty of the Villanova University Law School for inviting me to
be the Reuschlein Distinguished Visiting Professor in the spring of 1999. I greatly
admire the late Dean Harold Reuschlein and felt deeply honored to hold the
Reuschlein chair. My visit at Villanova was an immense pleasure.
I am grateful to my wife, Kwan Wang, for her many suggestions about my
speech and manuscript and to Professor Vik Amar for reading my manuscript and
making helpful comments. I would also like to thank Dean Joel Seligman and
Professors Steve Bainbridge, Rich Booth, Bill Carney, Jim Cox, David Faigman,
Henry Hansmann, Kim Krawiec, Jon Macey, Aaron Rappaport, Larry Ribstein, Bob
Thompson, Dick Turkington, Kelly Weisberg, Elliott Weiss and particularly Lynn
Stout for comments or suggestions about certain portions of my manuscript. I
greatly appreciate the help of my research assistants at Villanova: Jeffrey Campisi,
Robert Smith and especially Jeffrey Bodle.
Parts of this Article are drawn from the treatise: WILLIAM KS. WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 & Supp. 2000).
** Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. B.A.,
Amherst College. J.D., Yale Law School.
1. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.3, at 153-
66 (1996) [hereinafter INSIDER TRADING] (discussing meaning of "nonpublic");
WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARK I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 2000 SUPPLEMENT § 4.3,
at 61-65 (2000) [hereinafter INSIDER TRADING SuPP.] (same).
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") is consid-
ering adopting a clarifying rule in this area. See Neil Hare, Four Insider Trading
Rules Possible, SEC Solicitor Gonson Says, 31 SEC. REG. & LAw REP. (BNA) No. 29, at
973 (July 23, 1999) (discussing possibility of new rules on insider trading).
2. For discussion of the definition of materiality for § 10(b) and SEC rule lOb-
5 and its application to insider trading cases, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 4.2, at 129-52; INSIDER TRADING SUPP. § 4.2., at 39-61.
Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1999), and its accompanying rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1999), are important antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws. For § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, one definition of material information
adopted by the United States Supreme Court is: information which there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider important in de-
ciding whether to buy or sell. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32
(1988) (paraphrasing definition of materiality adopted in TSC Indus. v. Northway,
(27)
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1. Is the act of stock market insider trading a victimless crime (Part II)? 3
2. Is stock market insider trading fraud (Part III)?
4
3. When does insider trading or tipping violate federal securities law (Part
IV)? 5
4. Under federal securities law, what are some remedies and sanctions
against a stock market insider trader or tipper (Part V)?6
II. Is THE AcTrOF STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING A VICTIMLESS CRIME?
Perhaps surprisingly, a lively debate exists among academics over
whether to regulate insider trading at all. 7 Supporters of regulation argue
that society should forbid insider trading to preserve confidence in the
securities market.8 Opponents of regulation have a variety of arguments.9
One is that insider trading makes stock prices more accurate. 10 Remarka-
bly, both opponents and supporters of regulation often assume that in-
sider trading has no specific victims. 1 In other words, these commenta-
tors assume that insider trading is not even a but-for cause of harm. This
assumption is wrong.
The presence of victims is important to the debate. Analogous to this
issue is the controversy about regulating pornography. Some argue that
pornography is a victimless crime. Others contend that pornography in-
creases sex crimes or undermines respect for women. 12 Whether pornog-
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), for SEC rule 14a-9 and § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
3. See Part II infra notes 7-43 and accompanying text.
4. See Part III infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
5. See Part IV infra notes 50-96 and accompanying text.
6. See Part V infra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
7. For discussion of this debate, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2, at 13-
39; INSIDER TRADING SuPP. § 2, at 3-16.
8. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.3.1, at 29-33 (discussing loss of inves-
tor confidence and harm to stock market); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§ 2.3.1, at 8-12 (same).
9. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.2, at 14-29 (discussing arguments in
favor of insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 2.2, at 3-8 (same).
10. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.2.2, at 19-29 (discussing enhanced
stock market price accuracy that may result from insider trading); INSIDER TRADING
SuPP., supra note 1, § 2.2.2, at 4-8 (same).
11. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.5, at 62 & n.32 (citing commen-
tary stating that insider trading does not harm individual investors); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SuPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.5, at 22 (same).
12. For discussion and criticism of the research on the effects of pornography
on those who view it, see David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1059-66 &
nn.194-95 (1989). For discussion and excerpts from materials on the relationship
between obscenity and crime, see JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE IN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, 223-42 (4th ed. 1998). See generally APPLICA-
TIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LVEs: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND
REPRODUCTION 5-183 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (discussing pornography); An-
drea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985) (attacking pornography for its harmful effects on women).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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raphy has victims does not resolve the question of how to regulate it.
Nevertheless, society is more likely to regulate pornography strictly if it has
victims. Similarly, whether insider trading is a victimless crime does not
resolve the question of how to regulate it. Nevertheless, society is more
likely to regulate insider trading strictly if it has victims.
In fact, each act of stock market insider trading has specific victims.
This part of the Article will discuss the victims of the act of insider trading.
These victims are those who would be better off, but for the act of insider
trading. This part of the Article will not focus on the victims of the nondis-
closure accompanying a stock market insider trade.13
Assume that the outstanding number of shares of a company remains
constant between the time of the insider trade and public disclosure. Let
us focus on the shares outstanding at the time of public disclosure.
With an insider purchase of stock, the insider has more of that issue at
public disclosure. Someone else must have less. That someone is worse
off because of the insider trade.
With an insider sale of shares, the insider has less of that issue at pub-
lic disclosure. Someone else must have more. That someone is worse off
because of the insider trade.
Paraphrasing "the law of conservation of mass-energy,"1 4 I call this
phenomenon "the law of conservation of securities." 15 I label as "trade
victims" those harmed by the phenomenon of the "law of conservation of
securities."
Who are those harmed by the phenomenon of the "law of conserva-
tion of securities"? The victims are those whose transactions were either
13. Victims of the nondisclosure include those who would not have traded
had the information been disclosed to them. For discussion of the distinction be-
tween trade victims and nondisclosure victims, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 3.3.1-3.4.4, at 17-32;
infra notes 24, 55, 65 and accompanying text.
If an independent duty to disclose exists, the nondisclosure accompanying an
insider trade may harm the party owed the duty of disclosure. For discussion of
possible independent duties to disclose either to the party on the other side of the
insider trade or to the information source, see infra Part IV notes 50-96 and accom-
panying text.
Furthermore, if the act of insider trading triggers a duty to disclose to a large
class, the victims of the accompanying nondisclosure may be huge in number. For
discussion of such duty-triggering, see infra Part V notes 99-100 and accompanying
text.
14. See LLOYD MOTZ &JEFFERSON HANE WEAVER, THE STORY OF PHYSICS 341-45
(1989) (discussing "conservation of mass-energy in particle interactions"); TONY
ROTHMAN, INSTANT PHYsics: FROM ARISTOTLE TO EINSTEIN, AND BEYOND 129-30
(1995) (discussing law of conservation of mass-energy).
15. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.5-3.3.8, at 62-86 (discussing "Law
of Conservation of Securities"); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, §§ 3.3.5-3.3.7,
at 22-29 (same).
2000]
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preempted or induced by the insider trade.16 To paraphrase Milton
Friedman, there is no such thing as a free insider trade. 17
To explain preempted and induced traders, I shall use an analogy to
used cars. The used automobile market is roughly comparable to the se-
curities market. 18 Over the counter dealers, stock exchange specialists
and large block positioning firms often trade stock for their own account
with the public.' 9 All these market-makers are somewhat like used car
dealers.
Many commentators assume that stock exchange transactions are
anonymous. This is an oversimplification, at least with large block trades
between an institutional investor and a block positioner. 20 In fact, if Pru-
dential Life Insurance Company wants to sell a large block of IBM stock,
Prudential may sell to Goldman Sachs, a block positioner. Prudential and
Goldman Sachs know each other's identity before, during and after the
trade.
They could even ask each other questions before the transaction. At
least conceivably, Goldman Sachs could ask Prudential: "Do you have any
16. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 65-73 (discussing insider trad-
ing as cause in fact of harm to preempted or induced traders); INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 24-26 (same). For discussion of an analogy to sale of
used cars with a generic defect, see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
17. In 1975, Professor Milton Friedman published a book entitled, There is No
Such Thing as a Free Lunch. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS A
FREE LUNCH (1975). For a brief discussion of the history of this maxim, see David
A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers Call 911?,
43 VILL. L. REV. 409, 412 n.11 (1998).
18. For discussion of how the stock market functions, see INSIDER TRADING,
supra note 1, § 3.3.1; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21 (same).
19. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 48-56 (discussing over
counter market makers, stock exchange specialists, and block positioners); INSIDER
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21 (same).
20. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 52-56 (discussing transactions
between institutions and block positioners); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1,
§ 3.3.1, at 21 (same).
Measured by number of shares traded, roughly half of all New York Stock
Exchange reported volume consists of block trades (transactions of 10,000 shares
or more). See N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK 1998 DATA, at 16, 93 (1999) [hereinafter
N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK] (defining "block trade" as transaction of 10,000 or more
shares, "block trades" constituted 48.7% of all New York Stock Exchange reported
volume in 1998); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 21 & nn.9-10
(same, citing N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK, supra, at 16, 93).
Such blocks are often bought and sold by block positioning brokerage firms.
See N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK, supra, at 16 (New York Stock Exchange estimates that
roughly 27% of New York Stock Exchange block volume (transactions of 10,000 or
more shares) is facilitated by "block positioners" or "block traders"); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SuPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 21 & n.11 (same, citing N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK, at
16).
In 1992, institutional investors (both customer and broker-dealer) accounted
for an estimated 75-80% of the average daily volume on the New York Stock Ex-
change. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 52 & n.13 (citing various
sources).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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material, nonpublic information about IBM?" At least conceivably, Pru-
dential might lie in response. In other words, much trading in New York
Stock Exchange listed shares has aspects of face-to-face dealing.21 This
strengthens the analogy between stock market and used car transactions.
To illustrate how induced and preempted stock traders are harmed
by insider trading under the law of conservation of securities, I shall use
two analogies to used car trading:
(1) the solitary defect hypothetical, and
(2) the generic defect hypothetical. 22
In the solitary defect hypothetical, only one automobile is a lemon.
In contrast, in the generic defect situation, many individuals are buying
and selling cars, all the same year model and all with the same defect.
Even a slight change in price may dissuade or induce trading. Stock mar-
ket insider trading resembles the generic defect used car hypothetical.
The generic defect used car analogy will demonstrate two points: First,
each act of stock market insider trading has one or more particular vic-
tims. Second, these victims are anonymous. They exist, but, practically,
cannot be identified.
I shall start with the solitary defect used car hypothetical. Suppose Mr.
Greedie owns a 1998 Cadillac. He discovers that his particular automobile
has a major defect. He goes to a car dealer and sells the car for the going
price, $25,000.
Assume in the alternative that:
(1) the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or
(2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.
The dealer discovers the defect and is stuck with a lemon. The victim
of Greedie's sale is clearly the dealer.
Suppose the dealer does not discover the defect and resells the car to
Mr. Public Buyer. This resale is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
21. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 54-56 & nn.14-21 (discussing
how stock transaction between institution and block positioner has aspects of face-
to-face trade). Cf id. § 8.2.2, at 681-83 (discussing practical problems of distin-
guishing between "fortuitous" and "nonfortuitous" transactions as defined in
American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code).
22. For a much shorter discussion of used car analogies to insider trading, see
id. § 3.2, at 43, § 3.3.7, at 80-82.
For a brief discussion of a similar analogy involving sale of used law casebooks
based on inside information about a forthcoming new edition, see id. § 3.3.7, at 82-
83.
For a somewhat similar hypothetical involving the president of a closely held
corporation who sells company stock based on material nonpublic information (by
undercutting the selling price offer of one of the company's other ten sharehold-
ers), see id. § 3.2, at 44-46.
20001
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FIGURE 1:
SOLITARY DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL
(ONLY GREEDIE'S 1998 CADILLAC HAS DEFECT)
GREEDIE > DEALER > MR. PUBLIC BUYER,
SELLS LEMON TO SELLS SAME LEMON TO THE VICTIM
Assume that Mr. Public Buyer is now stuck with a lemon. Who is the
victim of Greedie's sale? Only one 1998 Cadillac is a lemon. If Greedie
had not sold his lemon to the dealer, the dealer would not have been able
to resell the lemon to Mr. Public Buyer. The victim of Greedie's sale is
Mr. Public Buyer.
Now, I shall turn to the generic defect example. (This hypothetical is
analogous to stock market insider trading.)
Suppose Mr. Greedie is an employee of General Motors. Through his
job at GM, Greedie receives material, nonpublic information that all 1998
Cadillacs have a major defect. By coincidence, Greedie personally owns a
1998 Cadillac. He immediately sells his Cadillac to a car dealer for the
going price, $25,000.
Again, assume in the alternative that:
(1) the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or
(2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.
When GM announces the news of the defect to the public, the price
of the 1998 Cadillac falls by $10,000. Greedie is clearly better off.
Who is the victim of Greedie's sale? Who in the universe would be
better off had Greedie not sold? Is it the car dealer who bought the Cadil-
lac? The answer is not necessarily.
Suppose, without changing its prices, the dealer resold Greedie's Cadil-
lac to Mr. Public Buyer before announcement of the defect. Mr. Public
Buyer is stuck with the lemon after the announcement.
Nevertheless, Mr. Public Buyer is also not necessarily the victim of
Greedie's sale. All 1998 Cadillacs are lemons, although only Greedie
knows this. Had Mr. Public Buyer not bought Greedie's car, he might
have purchased another 1998 Cadillac.
These transactions are illustrated in Figure 2 below:
FIGURE 2:
GENERIC DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL
(ALL 1998 CADILLACS HAVE THE SAME DEFECT)
GREEDIE > DEALER > MR. PUBLIC BUYER,
SELLS LEMON TO WITH NO CHANGE IN NOT NECESSARILY
PRICE, DEALER SELLS THE VICTIM
SAME LEMON TO
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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What is the difference between this generic defect hypothetical and the
solitary defect hypothetical? In the solitary defect hypothetical, Greedie's
car was the only one with the defect. In the solitary defect hypothetical,
had Greedie not sold his Cadillac, and had Mr. Public Buyer bought an-
other 1998 Cadillac, Mr. Public Buyer would have been better off
In the geneiic defect hypothetical, all 1998 Cadillacs have the same
defect. Innocent individuals without Greedie's information compete with
Greedie to sell 1998 Cadillacs with the same defect. Had Greedie not sold
his Cadillac, and had Mr. Public Buyer bought another 1998 Cadillac in-
stead of Greedie's, Mr. Public Buyer would have been equally worse off 23
This phenomenon has prompted some commentators to conclude
that each act of insider trading has no specific victims. 24 This conclusion is
wrong.
In the generic defect example, the insider trade has a specific victim.
Identifying this victim is easier if we assume that the dealer does not sell
Greedie's automobile to Mr. Public Buyer and still owns Greedie's car at
the time of public disclosure (as illustrated in Figure 3 below).
FIGURE 3:
THE VICTIM IN THE GENERIC DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL (ASSUME THAT
DEALER STILL OwNs GREEDIE'S CAR AT TIME OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE)
GREEDIE DEALER,
SELLS LEMON TO MAY OR MAY NOT BE VICTIM
DEPENDING ON SIZE OF
INVENTORY AT DISCLOSURE
DEALER MAY LOWER PRICES, AND MAY INDUCE MR. POTENTIAL TO
BUY ANOTHER 1998 CADILLAC
(INDUCED BUYER);
OR MAY DISSUADE MS. MARGINAL
FROM SELLING (PREEMPTED
SELLER)
Even if the dealer still owns Greedie's car at the time of the public
announcement of the defect, the dealer is not necessarily the victim of
23. See id. § 3.3.3, at 58-61 (discussing why party in privity is not necessarily
harmed by small stock market insider trade). For a discussion of why the party in
privity is not necessarily harmed by a large block trade based on material, nonpub-
lic information, see id. § 3.3.4, at 61.
24. See id. § 3.3.5, at 62 & n.32 (citing sources suggesting that insider trading
does not have specific victims); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.5, at 22
(same).
These commentators' conclusions apply only to the act of trading. For discus-
sion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure (or deceit) victims,
see supra note 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 55, 65 and accompanying
text. Victims of nondisclosure include those who would not have traded had the
information been disclosed to them.
20001
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Greedie's sale. Prior to public disclosure, the dealer may have passed the
harm to someone else.
The dealer desires a certain inventory level. Because of Greedie's
sale, the dealer's inventory of 1998 Cadillacs increased. The dealer sets a
price at which it will purchase a car from the public. The dealer sets a
higher price at which it will sell to the public. In an attempt to reduce
inventory, the dealer may have slightly reduced both its buying and selling
prices for 1998 Cadillacs.
Assume that Mr. Potential was interested in purchasing a 1998 Cadil-
lac. The lower price may have induced him to buy another 1998 Cadillac
(other than Greedie's) from the dealer. All 1998 Cadillacs have the same
defect. As an induced purchaser, Mr. Potential may be the victim of
Greedie's sale.
Alternatively, assume that Ms. Marginal owned a 1998 Cadillac and
was thinking about selling her automobile. The lower price may have dis-
suaded her from selling the car to the dealer. She may still hold the car at
the time of the public announcement of the defect. As a preempted seller,
Ms. Marginal may be the victim of Greedie's sale.
What is the difference between' this generic defect hypothetical and
the solitary defect hypothetical? In the solitary defect situation, Greedie's
automobile was the only one with the defect. In the solitary defect hypo-
thetical, if the dealer owned Greedie's particular car at discovery of the
defect, the dealer was worse off. The size of the dealer's total inventory of 1998
Cadillacs at discovery of the solitary defect was not relevant.
In the generic defect hypothetical, all 1998 Cadillacs have the defect.
The size of the dealer's inventory of 1998 Cadillacs at public disclosure is
crucial. The size of the inventory determines the dealer's damage.
The dealer is only worse off as a result of Greedie's sale if his sale
causes the dealer's inventory at disclosure to be higher than it otherwise
would have been. Initially, Greedie's sale increased the dealer's inventory.
Nevertheless, the dealer may have decreased its inventory by lowering prices.
The dealer may have shifted the harm to a preempted seller or induced
buyer.
In practice, identifying the preempted seller or induced buyer is im-
possible. In order to identify the victim, one must determine the prices
the dealer would have charged absent Greedie's sale. Then, one must as-
certain how the public would have reacted to these prices. This informa-
tion is unknowable. 25 Nevertheless, the victim still exists.
At the time of the defect's announcement, there are a fixed number
of 1998 Cadillacs. If Greedie has one less Cadillac at the time of the an-
nouncement, someone else must have one more. That someone is the
25. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 73-83 (discussing practical
difficulty of identifying those harmed by stock market insider trade); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 27-29 (same).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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victim of Greedie's sale. I call this "the law of conservation of used
automobiles."
If the sale of one car on inside information to the car dealer causes
even a slight lowering of the dealer's prices for 1998 Cadillacs, that decline
may dissuade or induce a transaction. If the dealer's prices do not change
(or if the price declines fail to dissuade or induce a trade), the loss falls on
the automobile dealer (an induced buyer). Under the "law of conserva-
tion of used automobiles," Greedie's sale must induce a purchase or pre-
empt a sale.
Only one victim exists: either a preempted seller, like Ms. Marginal,
or an induced buyer, like Mr. Potential or the dealer. The loss is not
spread among a large number of victims. The price decline after disclo-
sure falls on this one victim; that loss corresponds to Greedie's gain.
The law of conservation of used automobiles is similar to the law of
conservation of securities. Each stock market insider trade has one or more
specific victims, either induced and/or preempted traders. 26
26. In the landmark insider-trading case, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642 (1997), the Supreme Court said: "A misappropriator who trades on the basis
of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his advantageous market posi-
tion through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultane-
ously harms members of the investing public. See [Barbara Bader Aldave,
Misappropriation, A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HOFSTRA L. REv. 101] at 120-21 & n.107 (1984)." 521 U.S. at 656. For a discussion
of O'Hagan, see INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5 at 85-88, 4.5 at 107-
13, 5.4.1 at 188-89, 191-97, § 9.3.3, at 329-33.
Professor Aldave's article, cited above, stated:
As Professor Wang has explained, each act of "inside trading"-i.e., trad-
ing on material nonpublic information-benefits the "inside trader" and
harms other specific investors. It is virtually impossible, however, to iden-
tify the particular investors who are injured. Wang, Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who
Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1217, 1230-40
(1981). In [United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981)], the
conspirators' trading injured the investors who were induced to sell, or
who were preempted from buying, securities of the target companies.
The improper trading may also have injured other investors by affecting
the prices of the targets' securities.
Aldave, supra, at 120 n.107.
One commentator has stated: "The [O'Hagan] Court, in finding that the con-
nection to a purchase or sale had been formed by the "simultaneous harm [to]
members of the investing public," relied on Professor Aldave's article and on a
footnote therein citing to an article by Professor William K.S. Wang." Daniel A.
McLaughlin, The "In Connection With" Requirement of Rule lOb-5 as an Expectation
Standard, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 62 (1998); cf Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappro-
priation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1223, 1269 n.224 (1998) ("Professor Barbara Bader Aldave was one of the first
securities law scholars to advance investor protection concerns as specific policy
justifications for the "fraud on the source" version of the misappropriation the-
ory. . . . Professor Aldave was influenced, in part, by Professor William Wang's
arguments that insider trading directly damages contemporaneous traders in the
marketplace by causing them to sell (or buy) at an improper time or price.").
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One may make the following objection. Suppose an innocent individ-
ual fortuitously sells stock in advance of an announcement of adverse, ma-
terial information. Under the law of conservation of securities, does not
this innocent sale also cause harm? Does not this innocent sale either
preempt a sale or induce a purchase? The answer is yes.
Clearly, society will not impose liability on traders who -unknowingly,
fortuitously make advantageous trades prior to public disclosure. There-
fore, causing harm under the law of conservation of securities is not suffi-
cient in itself to impose liability.
Unlike innocent traders, however, stock market insider traders know-
ingly profit by taking advantage of others. This difference alone may or
may not be sufficient to impose liability.- (Suppose an analyst discovers
material nonpublic information about a corporation through diligent
outside research with no contact with company employees. If the analyst's
firm traded on this information, the transaction would harm preempted
or induced traders. Nevertheless, the analyst and the firm might not be
liable. 27)
One analogy is to but-for causation and proximate causation. 28 The
law of conservation of securities demonstrates that the insider trade is a
but-for cause of injury to specific victims. Whether the insider trade is a
proximate cause of harm is a separate issue. 29 Nevertheless, if the insider
trade is not even a but-for cause of injury, liability is much iess likely. As
mentioned earlier, as with pornography, whether insider trading has vic-
tims, affects, but does not resolve the question of how strictly to regulate
it.30
27. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 322 (1979) (for an argument that
federal securities law should not bar transactions where one party possesses infor-
mational advantage that public investors may lawfully overcome).
For an argument somewhat similar to Professor Brudney's but not limited to
stock transactions, see Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the
Law of Contracts, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978) (arguing that law should encourage
deliberate search for information that reveals change in circumstances affecting
relative values, because expediting relay of such information to market promotes
allocative efficiency). For discussion of possible weaknesses in Dean Kronman's
analysis, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.2.2, at 20 (arguing that is it difficult
to apply Kronman's standard).
For discussion of the difficult issue of selective disclosure to analysts, see infra
notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
For discussion of whether the dictum in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 &
nn.16-18 (1988), may suggest a reluctance to regulate analysts' use of material non-
public information because analysts help to preserve a "healthy market," see infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
28. For a general discussion of but-for causation (also called "causation in
fact"), see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263-66
(5th ed. 1984). For a general discussion of proximate cause, see id. at 263-321.
29. For discussion of when insider trading or tipping violates federal securi-
ties law, see infra Part IV.
30. See supra text accompanying note 12.
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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The analysis above deals with the specific ex post victims of a stock
market insider trade. What are some of the broader possible adverse effects
of insider trading?
If the public becomes aware of insider trading, the prices of stocks
generally may decline (although estimating the risk may be difficult). 31 If
the employees of a particular corporation acquire a reputation for trading
on nonpublic information, that specific company's stock may decline in
price.3 2 Such declines would increase the cost of capital of particular companies or
of publicly traded corporations generally.33
Ex ante, these price decreases might partially compensate new buyers
for the risk of being victims of stock market insider trading3 4 (although, as
mentioned earlier, estimating the risk would be difficult). Nevertheless,
ex post the harm of insider trading would not be spread equally. An in-
sider trade has arbitrary, but specific victims. These victims are dispropor-
tionately harmed by the trade. (Some victims, preempted buyers, may
never own stock in the issuer.)
Even ex ante, a decline in the price of all publicly traded stocks (or of
a particular stock) would not adequately compensate all investors for the
risk of being victims of a stock market insider trade. This risk of harm is
associated with the act of trading (or of almost trading, in the case of a
preempted trader). Consequently, the risk varies with the frequency of
one's trades (or "near trades").
Even if the return on all publicly traded stocks (or of a particular
stock) were slightly higher because of the risk of harm from insider trad-
ing, the higher return would not adequately compensate frequent traders
for incurring that risk. Nor would risk-averse investors who trade often be
able to diversify away the risk of becoming a victim.
In short, ex post, victims of a stock market insider trade are dispropor-
tionately injured even if they originally purchased their stock at a price that
31. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.3, at nn.1-4, n. 18 and accompany-
ing text (discussing insider trading's harm to investor confidence and consequent
possible increase in public corporations' cost of capital); INSIDER TRADING SuPP.,
supra note 1, § 2.3, at 8-10, 12-13.
32. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.3.2, at nn.16-17 and accompanying
text (noting possible decline in price of company's stock if public becomes aware
of insider trading by company's management).
33. See id. § 2.3.2, at nn.16-18 and accompanying text (discussing arguments
that if some investors refrain from purchasing shares because of possible insider
trading, cost of capital will increase); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.2,
at 12-13.
To return momentarily to the generic defect used car hypothetical, if public
buyers and sellers of used cars were often victims of insider trading, the sale prices
of new cars generally might decline. If the employees of a particular manufacturer
gain a reputation for trading that company's cars on nonpublic information, the
sale prices of that corporation's new automobiles might decrease.
34. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 72 & nn.48-49 and accompa-
nying text (discussing partial compensation of new buyers if prices of stocks de-
cline because of general public awareness of insider trading).
2000]
11
Wang: Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies - I
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
accurately reflected the possibility of insider trading. Even ex ante, fre-
quent traders definitely suffer harm from insider trading.
To analogize, suppose apartment rents in one neighborhood are
slightly lower because a small percentage of arbitrarily chosen residents
will be mugged and/or assaulted. Ex post, the unfortunate victims suffer
disproportionately and are only minimally compensated by the lower
rents. Ex ante, residents who take walks often are not adequately compen-
sated because they take more risk than others.
35
Because specialists and market-makers trade so frequently, they may
be disproportionately harmed from insider trading.3 6 Nevertheless, spe-
cialists and market-makers may sometimes pass the injury to others prior
to disclosure by altering prices and thereby readjusting inventory to the
level preferred.3 7 The presence of insider trading may cause specialists
and market makers to widen their spreads to compensate for the risk of
becoming a victim.3 8 If so, ex ante, specialists and market makers may
35. See id. § 3.3.6, at 65-73 & n.50 and accompanying text; INSIDER TRADING
SuPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 26. For a somewhat similar analogy, see id. § 3.5.2
and text accompanying note 20, supra.
36. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 82 n.66 (discussing how mar-
ket-makers are especially exposed to risk of harm of insider trading); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUpP., supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 27, 29 (same).
For Professor Jonathan Macey's conclusion that market-makers are dispropor-
tionately harmed by insider trading, see JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: Ec-
ONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 13-16 (1991). For an argument that the insider
trading profit represents a transfer of wealth from the market-maker to the trader,
see Norman S. Douglas, Insider Trading: The Case Against the 'Victimless Crime' Hy-
pothesis, 23 FIN. REv. 127 (1988). See generally David D. Haddock & Jonathan R.
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1449, 1457 (1987)
("Specialists and other market makers systematically profit from trades with outsid-
ers. But they systematically lose to insiders who are trading on inside
information.").
37. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.6-3.3.7, at 65-82 (discussing iden-
tity of victims of insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 3.3.6-
3.3.7, at 24-29 (same); supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text at the first print-
ing of Figure 3.
A surge in orders may itself send a message to the specialist or market-maker
that something good or bad is happening to the issuer, especially if he or she can
deduce the identity of the insider traders. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 2.2.2, at 26-27 & nn.37-38 and accompanying text (describing how trading vol-
ume and/or price movement may indicate that something positive or negative is
happening to issuer). Such a message would cause the specialist or market-maker
to adjust prices earlier and ease the task of maintaining the desired level of
inventory.
38. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAw 855-56
(1995) (explaining that market maker must increase spread to compensate for
losses to unidentified insider traders); Haddock & Macey, supra note 36, at 1457
(same); see also INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.4, at 15-16 (noting in-
sider trading may cause market-makers to widen spread); WilliamJ. Carney, Signal-
ing and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 888-89 (1987)
(explaining that market-makers increase their bid-ask spread to compensate for
risk of dealing with insider traders); John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now
Lawful?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 5-6 (July 31, 1997) (same); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, In-
sider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Op-
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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timization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1, 18 n.45 (1993) (same);
Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Special-
ist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72 (1985)
(same); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311,
331 (1987) (same); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUPREME CT.
ECON. REV. 123, 161-62 (Ernest Gelhorn & Nelson Lund eds., 1998) (noting that
insider trading may cause market-makers to widen spread); ElliottJ. Weiss, United
States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L.
395, 434 (1998) (noting that market-makers increase their bid-ask spreads to com-
pensate for risk of dealing with insider traders); Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a
Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REV. 377, 397 (1989) (same); Note, Insider
Trading in Junk Bonds, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1720, 1722-24 (1992) [hereinafter Junk
Bonds] (same, citing Hartmut Schmidt, Insider Regulation and Economic Theory, in
EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 21, 26-27 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1991)); Chung & Charoenwong, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread, 33 FIN. REV.
1, 8-11 (1998) (showing through results that, although market-makers may not be
able to detect insider trading when it occurs, they protect themselves by maintain-
ing larger spreads for stocks with greater extent of insider trading, as reported to
SEC in filings under § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) for a general
discussion of § 16(a) filings, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 15.2, at 1001-06;
INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 15.2, at 606-12); Lawrence R. Glosten &
Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21J. FIN. ECON.
123, 123-24 (1988) (noting that spreads are apparently determined in part by ex-
posure of market-makers to traders who are better informed than market-makers).
One of the amici briefs in O'Hagan made the following argument:
Trading in organized securities markets is usually effected through spe-
cialized intermediaries (e.g., market makers in dealer markets or special-
ists on the exchanges), who determine a bid-ask spread at which they
trade with public customers. The width of the spread between the prices
at which intermediaries will buy or sell (the bid-ask spread) is essentially a
measure of the efficiency of the market for a security. While dealers and
specialists are the initial victims of those who trade on misappropriated
material nonpublic information, they pass this injury along to public cus-
tomers through a widened bid-ask spread. To the extent it is foreseeable
that people will trade with misappropriated material nonpublic informa-
tion, intermediaries must protect themselves in advance by widening the
bid-ask spread. Thus trading by those who misappropriate material non-
public information for personal profit necessarily injures all public cus-
tomers by decreasing the price at which they can sell to intermediaries
(the bid) and increasing the price at which they can buy from in-
termediaries (the ask). Indeed, customers trading other securities will
also be injured, because dealers cannot anticipate which securities will be
traded by those in possession of material nonpublic information and will
consequently widen the bid-ask spread for all securities that may be the
subject of such information.
Amicus Curiae Brief of North American Securities Administrators Association,
Inc., and Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, at 8, United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842) (I assisted in the drafting of this brief). This
excerpt from the brief is reprinted in Ribstein, supra, at 161-62. For criticism of
the arguments in this excerpt, see id. at 161.
While discussing the likelihood that market markers will widen bid-ask spreads
to compensate for the risk of dealing with insider traders, one commentator has
noted: "This risk of dealing with insider traders is magnified in the options market,
a favorite haven for insider traders because of the leverage it provides to the value
of the information." A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and
Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13, 50 (1998).
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pass some or all of their injury from insider trading to the public. The
increase in spreads would harm all public trading investors, 39 but espe-
cially those who trade often. Again, ex ante, more frequent traders would
bear the brunt of the harm of insider trading.40 (In addition, the increase
in bid-ask spreads may deter investors from trading.4 1 This would de-
crease the liquidity of the market.42 )
These are only some of the possible adverse effects of insider trading.
A full discussion of the broader arguments both for and against regulation
is beyond the scope of this Article. 43
For discussion of how the stock market functions, see INSIDER TRADING, supra
note 1, § 3.3.1, at 48-56; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21.
To return momentarily to the generic defect used car hypothetical, if used car
dealers were frequent victims of insider trading, their profits would decline. To
compensate for this loss, they would widen the spread between the price at which
they buy from the public and the price at which they sell to the public.
39. See INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.4, at 15-16 (discussing in-
sider trading's possible harm to investors generally); supra note 38. But see Rib-
stein, supra note 38, at 162 ("Increased spreads hurt investors only in the trivial
sense that stock returns are not as high as they might be in a perfect world.").
40. For a discussion of the disproportionate harm of insider trading on fre-
quent traders, see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
41. See Junk Bonds, supra note 38, at 1724 (noting that trading by outsiders will
decrease as spread widens).
42. See id. (noting decreased outsider trading will reduce liquidity); Weiss,
supra note 38, at 434 (same); see also Georgakopoulos, supra note 38, at 30-31, 36
(discussing how reducing transaction costs of outsider traders increases liquidity).
But cf. Ribstein, supra note 38, at 163-65 (questioning whether decreased liquidity
is harmful); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading,
3J. FIN. SERV. RES. 101, 102-03 (1989) (arguing that stock transfer tax is likely to
increase overall efficiency of American economy by discouraging short-term specu-
lative trading); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is
a Motley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 808-10 (1997) (arguing that,
if investor demand for speculative trading is highly elastic, increasing investors'
marginal costs of trading may actually decrease both speculative trading and inves-
tors' aggregate transaction costs and thereby increase investor welfare); Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Reg-
ulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 667-91 (1995) (concluding that much stock trading is
speculative: "Alleged efficiency benefits of speculative trading are at least exagger-
ated, and possibly illusory." Id. at 691); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Sum-
mers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities
Transaction Tax, 3J. FIN. SERV. RES. 261, 262-72 (1989) (noting that United States
stock markets may have "excessive" liquidity, thereby encouraging speculation and
increasing volatility). For disagreement with Professor Stout's Virginia Law Review
article and the suggestion of an alternative reason for excessive stock trading (in-
centive structures facing investors and financial intermediaries), see Paul G. Maho-
ney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive Trading?," 81 VA. L. REv. 713 (1995). For Professor
Stout's reply to Professor Mahoney, see Lynn A. Stout, Agreeing to Disagree Over
Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. REv. 751 (1995).
Extrapolating from these contrary authorities, any increase in bid-ask spreads
arguably might benefit society by deterring excessive stock trading and
speculation.
43. For an extensive discussion of the arguments for and against regulation of
stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 2-3, at 13-118;
INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, §§ 2-3, at 3-34.
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III. Is STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING FRAUD?
In a traditional fraud scenario, the victim is the party on the other
side of the trade. Also, disclosure in advance of the transaction would
have saved the victim from harm.
To examine whether stock market insider trading is fraud, I shall rely
on the Greedie used car hypothetical. The typical fraud situation is the
solitary defect Greedie hypothetical. Greedie's particular automobile is a
lemon. Greedie sells the car to the dealer. Greedie either lies to the
dealer or fails to disclose a material defect. The dealer discovers the de-
fect and is stuck with the lemon.
Below is a reprint of Figure 1 (the solitary defect hypothetical):
FicuRE 1:
SOLITARY DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL
(ONLY GREEDIE'S 1998 CADILLAC HAS DEFECT)
GREEDIE > DEALER > MR. PUBLIC BUYER,
SELLS LEMON TO SELLS SAME LEMON TO THE VICTIM
Suppose the dealer does not discover the solitary defect and sells the
car to Mr. Public Buyer. Suppose Mr. Public Buyer is stuck with the
lemon. Is Greedie's conduct fraud?
The victim is not the party on the other side of Greedie's trade, i.e.,
the dealer. Still, disclosure by Greedie in advance of his proposed sale
would have prevented the dealer from purchasing and would have saved
Mr. Public Buyer from loss.
Maybe Greedie's conduct is still fraud even when Mr. Public Buyer is
the victim. Maybe the victim offraud need not be the party on the other side of the
trade.
Now I shall examine whether Greedie's conduct in the generic defect
hypothetical constitutes fraud. Below is a reprint of Figure 3 (the generic
defect hypothetical):
FIGURE 3:
THE VICTIM IN THE GENERIC DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL (ASSUME THAT
DEALER STILL OwNs GREEDIE'S CAR AT TIME OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE)
GREEDIE > DEALER,
SELLS LEMON TO MAY OR MAY NOT BE VICTIM
DEPENDING ON SIZE OF INVENTORY
AT DISCLOSURE
DEALER MAY LOWER PRICES, AND MAY INDUCE MR. POTENTIAL TO BUY
ANOTHER 1998 CADILLAC (INDUCED
BUYER);
OR MAY DISSUADE MS. MARGINAL FROM
SELLING (PREEMPTED SELLER)
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Again, assume alternatively that: (1) the dealer does not ask Greedie
about any defect, or (2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and
Greedie lies. Is Greedie's conduct in the generic defect hypothetical fraud?
In the generic defect situation, all 1998 Cadillacs have the defect.
The victim of Greedie's sale is not necessarily either the dealer or Mr.
Public Buyer. The victim exists, but cannot be identified. The victim
might be either a preempted seller, like Ms. Marginal, or an induced
buyer, like Mr. Potential or the dealer.
Is Greedie's misconduct fraud? Greedie's lie or nondisclosure facili-
tates or even enables Greedie's sale to the dealer. The sale causes harm to
the anonymous victim. Nevertheless, even though a lie or nondisclosure
facilitates misconduct, the misconduct may not necessarily be fraud. For
example, nondisclosure facilitates embezzlement. Embezzlement is not
necessarily labeled fraud.
At least three significant differences exist between traditional fraud
and Greedie's misconduct in the generic defect situation. First, in the ge-
neric defect hypothetical, premature disclosure by Greedie to either the
dealer or to the world may be a breach of duty to Greedie's employer,
General Motors. Second, disclosure of the generic defect by Greedie to
just the dealer might also be offensive. This would give an unfair advan-
tage to the dealer in its transactions with others. 4 4 Third, disclosure by
Greedie may not help the victim of Greedie's misconduct if the victim is a
preempted seller. Suppose the real victim of Greedie's sale is a preempted
seller, like Ms. Marginal. (Ms. Marginal is someone who would have sold a
1998 Cadillac, but for Greedie's sale. Greedie's sale decreased the dealer's
price for 1998 Cadillacs. This price decline dissuaded Ms. Marginal from
selling.45 )
Had Greedie disclosed just to the dealer, the dealer would have
ceased buying 1998 Cadillacs. Ms. Marginal still would not have sold. Ms.
Marginal would not be saved from loss. Suppose Greedie disclosed the
defect to the world in a press release. The price of 1998 Cadillacs would
have drastically declined. Ms. Marginal still would not be saved from
44. But see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1983) (stating that insider/
tipper does not violate rule 1Ob-5 under "classical relationship" theory unless tip is
for "personal benefit." Conceivably, selective disclosure to avoid committing fraud
in a face-to-face transaction might be considered motivated by "personal benefit").
For a discussion of SEC rule 1Ob-5 liability for tipping under the "classical relation-
ship" theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43; INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 174-81; infra notes 75-80 and 83-93 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the "classical relationship" theory, see INSIDER TRAD-
ING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,§§ 5.2.1-5.3.5, at 144-86; infra Part IV and notes 57-65.
45. See supra Part II, text accompanying Figure 3 (discussing Ms. Marginal as
preempted seller victim).
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harm. In other words, disclosure by Greedie would not have saved the
victim of his sale, Ms. Marginal.4 6
In short, in the generic defect hypothetical, Greedie's conduct has
some features of fraud, especially if he lies. Nevertheless, his conduct dif-
fers from traditional fraud in several respects. Disclosure by Greedie to
the party on the other side or to the public might breach other duties.
Also, such disclosure would not save the victim of the trade if the victim is
a preempted seller. Whether Greedie's misconduct is fraud is not clear.
What difference does it make whether his misconduct is fraud? Sup-
pose a federal statute provides: "thou shalt not commit fraud in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a used automobile." Assume that violation
of the statute is a federal crime. Should the federal used car fraud statute
apply to Greedie's sale in the generic defect hypothetical?
How ajudge answers this question depends in part on judicial conser-
vatism versus judicial activism. An extremely conservative judicial solution
would be to refuse to apply the federal act.47
True, Greedie either has lied or has failed to disclose material infor-
mation. Nevertheless, what seems objectionable about his conduct is not
the fraud, but the unjust taking from the anonymous victim of the transac-
tion. The victim may not be the dealer.
One principle of statutory construction is to interpret criminal stat-
utes narrowly.48 The judiciary could wait for Congress to amend the Act
to prohibit expressly this type of unjust enrichment.
46. This hypothetical involves the seller of a used car with a generic defect.
For a somewhat similar hypothetical involving the president of a closely held cor-
poration who sells company stock based on material nonpublic information (by
undercutting the selling price offer of one of company's other ten shareholders),
see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 44-46.
47. Cf Transcript of the Roundtable on Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory
after O'Hagan, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 7, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Roundtable] (com-
ments of Mr. Arthur R. Mathews) (stating that members of majority in United States
v. OHagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), "really gave no treatment to the fact that their
decision was letting the courts manufacture a crime rather than having Congress
legislate a crime. I think that violates the separation of powers concept. .. ").
48. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (discussing briefly
rule of lenity as one of "three related manifestations of the fair warning require-
ment"); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2(d) (2d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1998) (explaining rule that requires strict construction of criminal
statutes in favor of defendant); Steven B. Duke, Legality in the Second Circuit, 49
BROOK. L. REv. 911, 911 (1983) (discussing doctrine of strict construction of crimi-
nal statutes, also known as rule of lenity); see also United States v. Brennan, 183
F.3d 139, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting in dictum that case against defendants is
seriously problematic in part because of rule of lenity); Audrey Strauss, Mail Fraud
and the Rule of Lenity, 222 N.Y.LJ. 5 (Nov. 4, 1999) (discussing Brennan and Lanier).
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT.
REv. 345 (discussing debate among Supreme Court justices over lenity and recom-
mending abolition of rule of lenity and substitution of theory of federal common
law crimes). But cf Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1999) ("We
have repeatedly stated that: '[t] he rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing every-
thing from which aid can be derived .... we can make no more than a guess as to
17
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A more activist judicial solution would be to extend the federal used
car fraud statute to Greedie's misconduct. The conduct seems offensive
and close enough to fraud to include within the act.
What about stock market insider trading under the federal securities
laws? No federal statute expressly prohibits stock market insider trading.
Federal statutes do prohibit securities fraud.49 As with the hypothetical
used car fraud act, there is no obvious answer to the question whether
what Congress intended."' (quoting Muscarelto v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138
(1998), which in turn quoted United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997), which
in turn quoted Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995), which in turn quoted Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993) and Ladnerv. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178
(1958)).
In his dissent in United States v. O'Hagan, Justice Scalia rejected the rule lOb-5
misappropriation doctrine. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting with respect to misappropriation doc-
trine). For discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, see infra Part IV, notes 66-
72 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia said:
In light of that principle [of lenity applied to criminal statutes], it seems
to me that the unelaborated statutory language: "[t]o use or employ in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance," [in] § 10(b), must be construed to
require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities
transaction.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679. For discussion of this dissent, see INSIDER TRADING SupP.,
supra note 1, § 4.5, at 108 n.25(l) and accompanying text.
For discussion of the application of rule of lenity to regulation of insider trad-
ing under the federal securities laws, see Roundtable, supra note 47, at 12 (com-
ments of Mr. Arthur R. Mathews) (noting members of O'Hagan majority "[r]eally
gave no treatment to the fact that their decision was letting the courts manufacture
a crime rather than having Congress legislate a crime. I think that violates the
separation of powers concept and it violated other doctrines of criminal law"); id.
at 16 (comments of Professor Roberta S. Karmel) (recognizing "in a criminal case,
courts are confronted with the doctrine that criminal statutes are not supposed to
be construed as broad remedial statutes. They are supposed to be construed
strictly"). Cf id. at 17 (comments of Professor Marcel Kahan) (stating "[t]he best
argument against the case [O'Hagan] is that this is a criminal case and it is not
right for courts to define crimes out of fresh clothes"); id. at 18 (comments of
Judge Ralph K. Winter) (stating "[b]ut, in criminal law, to have a crime that is not
defined, either in terms of what it is or what the rationale is for its being illegal,
invites prosecutorial misconduct"). But cf id. at 27 (comments of Professor Marcel
Kahan) (arguing that because federal mail/wire fraud statutes already broadly pro-
hibit stock market insider trading, there is less need to construe narrowly federal
securities laws: "[a] lot of people on the panel have voiced the argument that there
is a very undefined law here and we are sending people tojail. Does the argument
not apply to the same extent against mail and wire fraud?").
49. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4, at 119-277 (explaining basic ele-
ments of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule lOb-5);
INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 4, at 35-142 (same); INSIDER TRADING, supra
note 1, § 10, at 711-32 (discussing § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); INSIDER
TRADING, supra note 1, § 10, at 33943 (same). For a discussion of SEC rule 14e-3,
which does expressly regulate insider trading and tipping in the context of tender
offers, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 9, at 685-709; INSIDER TRADING SuPP.,
supra note 1, § 9, at 321-38.
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stock market insider trading violates the federal securities fraud statutes.
An activist court would say yes. A conservative court might say no.
IV. WHEN DOES STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING VIOLATE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw?
A. Introductory Remarks
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission")
has adopted a special rule, 14e-3, prohibiting insider trading (and tipping)
about a forthcoming tender offer.50 (Incidentally, the extent to which this
rule is valid is still unsettled, even after United States v. O'Hagan).5 1
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the
SEC to adopt rules prohibiting "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance."
52
The Commission has adopted rule lOb-5. 53 Loosely paraphrased, that rule
states: "thou shalt not commit fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."54
Does rule 10b-5 cover stock market insider trading? Has the Supreme
Court taken an activist or a conservative view of this issue? The Court has
chosen a middle course. Rule lOb-5 covers most, but not all, insider
trading.
Rather than focus on the victims of the act of trading, the Court has
focused on the victims of certain independent disclosure duties. These in-
dependent duties are breached by the nondisclosure that accompanies the
stock market insider trade.5 5
The Court has endorsed two bases of rule lob-5 liability:
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 9, at
685-709 (discussing SEC rule 14e-3); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 9, at
321-38 (same). For the text of the rule 14e-3 see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 9.1, n.2.
51. O'Hagan is ambiguous about the validity of 14e-3. See INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 9.3.3, at 329-33. Unfortunately, examining rule 14e-3 is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
52. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1999). For the full text of § 10(b), see INSIDER TRADING,
supra note 1, § 4.1, at 121 n.1. For a general discussion of § 10(b), see INSIDER
TRADING, supra note 1, § 4, at 119-277; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 4, at
35-142.
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). For a general discussion of rule lOb-5, see
INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4, at 119-277; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§ 4, at 35-142.
54. For the text of rule lOb-5, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 121
n.1.
55. For discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure
victims, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, §§ 3.3-3.4, at 17-32 (same); supra notes 12, 24 and accompany-
ing text (same); infra note 65 and accompanying text (same).
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(1) the "classical relationship" theory, and (2) the misappropriation
doctrine. 56
B. The "Classical Relationship" Theory
A stock market insider trader has a duty to disclose material informa-
tion to the party on the other side of the trade when the two have a so-
called "classical relationship." 57 This duty is breached by the material
nondisclosure accompanying the insider trade.
A "classical relationship" exists when the insider trader is an employee
or independent contractor of the company that issued the shares bought or
sold. The "classical relationship" is a triangle, illustrated in Figure 4
below.
FIGuRE 4:
THE "CLASSICAL RELATIONSHIP" TRIANGLE
ISSUER (A) OF STOCK TRADED
EMPLOYEEIINDEP.-K. TRADER/TIPPER (B-1) INNOCENT PARTY ON
OTHER SIDE OF TRADE (C)
[TRADING OUTSIDER/rIPPEE (B-2);
OUTSIDE TRIANGLE, BUT MAY BE PARTICIPANT (ALREADY A S/H OR
AFTER THE FACT IN B-I'S VIOLATION] BECOMES ONE WITH THE
TRADE)
At the apex of the triangle is the issuer (A), the corporation that is-
sued the stock traded. At one end of the base of the triangle is the stock
market insider trader (B-i). (I shall discuss tippers and tippees (B-2)
later. 58) At the other end of the base of the triangle is the innocent party
on the opposite side of the insider trade.59
56. On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed rule 10b5-2, which would fur-
nish a nonexclusive list of circumstances when a person has a duty of trust or confi-
dence under the misappropriation docutrine. For a discussion of this proposed
rule, see infra note 66.
57. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354 (discussing "class-
ical relationship" theory); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86
(same).
58. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of the "classical relationship" triangle specifically, see
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-55, 657-58 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 283-90; INSIDER
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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To explain the nature of this "classical relationship" triangle, I shall
briefly describe a similar triangle, illustrated in Figure 5 below.
FIGURE 5:
THE VILLANOVA/PROFESSOR/STUDENT TRIANGLE
VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
A
PROFESSOR STUDENT
Professor Teacher is on the faculty of Villanova University Law
School. She has no direct contractual relationship with the school's stu-
dents. Nevertheless, she has an employment relationship with the law
school. The students have a relationship with the law school as well. They
pay tuition. Because of the mutual relationship to the school, Professor
Teacher has a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with each student.
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 4,60 any employee or independent
contractor (B-i) of a corporation has an employment relationship with the
issuing company (A). The innocent party on the other side of the trade
(C) also has a relationship with the issuing corporation (A). That party
(C) is either a shareholder of the issuer (A), or becomes one simultaneous
with the insider trade.6 1
Because of the mutual relationship to the issuing company (A), the
shareholder (C) and the employee/independent contractor (B-i) have a
"classical relationship."
Figure 6 below provides a concrete example of the "classical relation-
ship" triangle:
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 144-48 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642, 651-52, 660-61 (1997)).
60. See Figure 4 and text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
61. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8 (suggesting that innocent buyer may
enter into classical relationship with insider seller simultaneously with trade be-
tween them); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 290 & n.31 (citing and
quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8).
2000]
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FicuRE 6:
THE "CLASSICAL RELATIONSHIP" TRIANGLE
(ISSUER/JANITOR/SHAREHOLDER EXAMPLE)
ISSUER (A) OF STOCK TRADED
A
JANITORIAL SERVICE FIRM INNOCENT PARTY ON
OTHER SIDE OF TRADE (C)
MR. CLEAN, THE
JANITOR (B), WHO DID NOT (ALREADY A S/H OR
DISCLOSE TO THE PARTY ON BECOMES ONE WITH THE TRADE)
OTHER SIDE OF THE INSIDER TRADE
Suppose Mr. Clean works for a janitorial service that contracts to
clean the offices of a company at night. Some executives are working late.
Mr. Clean overhears material, nonpublic information. On the basis of
that information, Mr. Clean buys or sells the corporation's stock.
Mr. Clean is in the "classical relationship triangle." Mr. Clean, the
janitor (B), works for an independent contractor, the janitorial service,
that works for the company (A) that issued the stock Mr. Clean trades.
The party on the other side of Mr. Clean's transaction (C) is also in
the triangle. That party (C) is either an existing shareholder or becomes
one simultaneously with the insider trade.
Mr. Clean has traded on material, nonpublic information without dis-
closing the information to the party on the other side. This material non-
disclosure is a breach of the duty resulting from the "classical relationship"
between Mr. Clean ("B") and the party in privity ("C"). The insider trade
violates rule lOb-5.62
In its "classical relationship" approach, the Supreme Court ignores
the possibility that, absent the insider trade, the party on the other side
might have traded with someone else. In other words, at first blush, the
Court seems to treat "classical relationship" stock market insider trading as analo-
gous to the solitary defect hypothetical, even though, in reality, such stock market
62. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.1, 5.2.7, at 283-90, 335-36 (ex-
plaining "classical relationship"); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at
144-47 (same).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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insider trading is comparable to the generic defect used car hypothetical.63 With
stock market insider trading, many individuals are buying and selling the
same stock.
The Court might respond as follows: although the party on the other
side of the insider trade, "C," is not necessarily the victim of the act of
insider trading, "C" is the victim of the nondisclosure accompanying the
insider trade that breaches the independent duty to disclose created by the
"classical relationship." 64 Had the insider trader disclosed in advance to
"C," "C" would not have traded.
65
C. The Misappropriation Doctrine
The Supreme Court has also endorsed a second basis of insider trading
liability under rule lOb-5: the misappropriation doctrine. Under this the-
ory, stock market trading on material, nonpublic information violates rule
lOb-5 when both:
(1) the trade breaches a fiduciary duty to the information source, e.g., a
direct or indirect employer,6 6 and
63. For the solitary defect and generic defect hypotheticals, see supra Part I, espe-
cially text accompanying printings of Figures 1, 2 and 3.
64. For a discussion of why the party on the other side of the insider trade is
not necessarily the victim of the act of insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra
note 1, §§ 3.3.3-3.3.4, at 58-61; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.3, at 22
(same). For a used car analogy, see the text accompanying both note 23 and first
printing of Figure 2.
65. For a discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure
victims, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, §§ 3.3-3.4, at 17-32; supra notes 13, 24, 55 and accompanying
text.
66. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 n.7 (1997) (stating
"[w]here . . . a person trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information
owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to two entities or persons-for example, a
law firm and its client-but makes disclosure to only one, the trader may still be
liable under the misappropriation theory").
On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed rule 10b5-2, which would furnish a
nonexclusive list of circumstances when a person has a duty of trust or confidence
under the misappropriation doctrine:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic infor-
mation and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pat-
tern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information has a reasonable ex-
pectation that the other person would maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic informa-
tion from the person's spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however,
that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate
that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the informa-
tion, by establishing that the spouse, parent, child, or sibling that was the
source of the information had no reasonable expectation that the person
would keep the information confidential, because the parties had neither
a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, nor an agreement
or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
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(2) the trader fails to disclose this breach to the information source
before transacting.
6 7
For example, suppose Ms. Junior clerks for a state judge. Her em-
ployer prohibits her from trading on material, nonpublic information
gained through her employment. She learns that the judge is about to
issue a decision dramatically benefitting a company. She buys that corpo-
ration's stock.
Ms. Junior does not work for that company. Therefore, she is not in
the "classical relationship triangle." Nevertheless, she violates rule 10b-5
under the misappropriation doctrine.
Where is the fraud? The Supreme Court finds fraud in the failure to
inform the information source in advance of the plan to breach a duty. 68
Figure 7 below provides a concrete example designed to highlight the
difference between the "classical relationship theory" and the misappro-
priation doctrine.
SEC Rel. Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209, File No. S7-31-99 (Dec. 20, 1999), 1999
WL 1217849, *37 (S.E.C.) (emphasis added), available in <www.sec.gov.rules/pro-
posed/34-42259.htm>. For additional discussion of proposed rule 10b5-2, see
1999 WL 1217849, *2, *17, *21-25, *30, *33.
On December 20, 1999, the Commission also proposed rule 10b5-1, which
would provide that insider trading liability generally arises when someone trades
while "aware" of material nonpublic information, but also would provide four ex-
ceptions from liability. See 1999 WL 1217849, *2, *17-20, *30, *33, *35-37.
On the same date, the SEC proposed Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which
would prohibit publicly traded companies from selectively disclosing material non-
public information. See id. at *2-17, *27-30, *32-35, *37-40. For additional discus-
sion of this proposed regulation, see infra note 93.
67. See OHagan, 521 U.S. at 646-66 (1997) (discussing misappropriation doc-
trine); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 4.5, at 192-96, 5.4, at 354-89 (same); IN-
SIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 4.5, at 106-13, 5.4, at 186-222 (same).
68. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-55, 659 n.9 (finding no § 10(b) liability for
misappropriation when insider trader discloses his or her trading plans to, or ob-
tains authorization from, principal); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.1,
at 192 & nn.49(k)-49(p) and accompanying text (disussing O'Hagan).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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FIGURE 7:
THE "CLASSICAL RELATIONSHIP" TRIANGLE (ISSUER; CATERING-SERVICE/
BARTENDER; SHAREHOLDER EXAMPLE)
ISSUER (A) OF STOCK TRADED
CATERING-SERVICE FOR ISSUER INNOCENT PARTY ON
OTHER SIDE OF TRADE (C)
MR. SERVER, THE BARTENDER (B),
WHO DID NOT DISCLOSE TO THE (ALREADY A S/H OR
PARTY ON OTHER SIDE OF THE BECOMES ONE WITH THE TRADE)
INSIDER TRADE
Suppose Mr. Server (B) is a bartender working for a caterer at a com-
pany function. He overhears material, nonpublic information and trades
the company's stock.
Mr. Server (B) indirectly works for the corporation (A) whose shares
he trades. He is in the "classical relationship" triangle and violates rule
1Ob-5. 69
In contrast, suppose Mr. Server is a bartender at a bar in the financial
district, called "The Bull and the Bear." He overhears some customers
discussing material, nonpublic information about a company. The infor-
mation does not relate to a tender offer. Mr. Server trades on that infor-
mation. Does he violate federal securities law?
Mr. Server does not work directly or indirectly for the company whose
stock he trades. Therefore, he is not in the "classical relationship"
triangle.
What about misappropriation? Has he breached a duty to the informa-
tion source?
There are two possible information sources:
(1) The customers whose conversation Mr. Server overheard.
(2) Mr. Server's employer, because Mr. Server overheard the conversation
during his employment.
69. See supra Figure 6 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 62
(providing similar analysis involving janitorial service rather than catering
service).
2000]
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Has Mr. Server breached a duty to the customers? A lawyer owes a
duty to a client not to trade on confidential information from the client.
70
What about a bartender and a customer? Probably, the bartender has no
duty to a customer,7 ' but this is not certain. 72
Has Mr. Server, the bartender, breached a duty to his employer? That
depends on the policy of the bar, "The Bull and the Bear." If the "Bull
and the Bear" prohibits insider trading by its employees based on informa-
tion obtained during employment, then Mr. Server's trade violates rule
10b-5 under the misappropriation doctrine. In short, his trading may or
may not violate rule lOb-5, depending on the facts and on judicial inter-
pretation of when the trader owes a duty to the information source.
D. Summary of the Federal Securities Law Liability of Insider Traders
To summarize and oversimplify, insider trading violates federal securi-
ties law in three instances:
73
(1) When it relates to information about a forthcoming tender offer.
This is SEC rule 14e-3.
(2) When the insider trader has a "classical relationship" with the party on
the other side of the trade. This is the rule lOb-5 "classical relationship"
theory.
(3) When the trade on material, nonpublic information breaches a duty
to the information source, e.g., a direct or indirect employer, and the
trader fails to disclose this breach to the information source before trans-
acting. This is the rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine.
To digress, if an employee breaches a duty to an employer not to trade
based on material, nonpublic information, two federal criminal statutes,
70. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.2.6, at 379-80 (discussing attor-
ney/client relationship and rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine); INSIDER TRAD-
INC SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.2.6, at 209-12 (same).
71. Cf Thomas Lee Hazen, "Insider Trading" Under Rule lOb-5, American Law
Institute-American Bar Assn. Continuing Legal Education, SC20 ALI-ABA 377, 382
(Aug. 14, 1997) (stating that it is legal for waiter to trade on overheard conversa-
tion between two directors dining at restaurant); Stefan Rubin, Comment, Corpo-
rate Law: Misappropriation Theory of Liability Upheld for Rule lOb-5 Criminal
Convictions, 50 FiA. L. REv. 405, 416 (1998) (same citing Thomas Lee Hazen,
supra).
72. For a discussion of the uncertain source of the fiduciary duty in misappro-
priation, see INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.1A, at 197-203.
73. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, at 4 (providing longer list, with five
instances (the following list plus mail/wire fraud and § 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933)); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, at 1 (same). For discussion of the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes and their application to stock market insider
trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11, at 733-60; INSIDER TRADING SUPP.,
supra note 1, § 11, at 345-63. For discussion of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
and its application to stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note
1, § 10, at 711-32; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 10, at 33943.
[Vol. 45: p. 27
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the federal mail and wire fraud provisions, would cover such a deprivation
of "another of the intangible right of honest services."
74
E. Liability of Tippers and Tippees
Not only may insider trading violate rule 1Ob-5, tipping others may also
be illegal. Oversimplifying again, if someone would violate the rule lOb-5
"classical relationship" theory by trading,7 5 he or she violates the rule by
tipping someone who trades, provided the tip confers a "personal benefit"
on the tipper.76 Even a vicarious "personal benefit" suffices.
77
Below is a reprint of Figure 4:
74. For discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and their appli-
cation to stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11, at
733-60; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 11, at 345-63. For discussion of the
1988 amendment to the mail and wire fraud statutes extending their coverage to
the deprivation of "another of the intangible right of honest services," see INSIDER
TRADING, supra note 1, § 11.3.2.1, at 750-57 & nn.39, 47-48; INSIDER TRADING SUPP.,
supra note 1, § 11.3.2.1, at 355-59 & n.39.
Thus far, the courts have not explored the insider trader's mail/wire fraud
duty to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade. Under this unexamined
obligation, a stock market insider trader might conceivably have a duty to disclose
to the party on the other side even in the absence of a "classical relationship." For
discussion of the insider trader's possible mail/fraud duty to disclose to the party
on the other side of the trade, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2, at 757-
60; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2, at 361-63. For discussion of the
rule lOb-5 classical relationship theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-
5.3, at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86; supra
notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of the "classical relationship" theory, see INSIDER TRAD-
ING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86; supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
76. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-64 (1983) (stating tip is breach of in-
sider's fiduciary duty if insider receives personal benefit from tip); INSIDER TRAD-
ING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43 (describing breach of fiduciary duty when
insider tips for personal benefit); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at
174-81 (same).
77. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 ("The elements of fiduciary duty and exploita-
tion of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confiden-
tial information to a trading relative or friend."); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 5.2.8.3, at 33840 (discussing how to demonstrate tipper's personal benefit); IN-
SIDER TRADING SUPp., supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 176-77 (same).
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FIGURE 4:
THE "CLASSiCAL RELATIONSHIP" TRIANGLE
ISSUER (A) OF STOCK TRADED
EMPLOYEEIINDEPENDENT-CONTRACTOR INNOCENT PARTY ON
TRADER/TIPPER (B-I) OTHER SIDE OF TRADE (C)
[TRADING OUTSIDER/TIPPEE (B-2); (ALREADY A S/H OR
OUTSIDE TRIANGLE, BUT MAY BE BECOMES ONE WITH THE
PARTICIPANT AFTER THE FACT IN B-I'S TRADE)
VIOLATION
Suppose "B-I" has material, nonpublic information and trading on
the information would be illegal under the rule lOb-5 "classical relation-
ship" theory. "B-I" violates rule 1Ob-5 by tipping "B-2" (e.g., a friend or
relative) who trades, provided that "B-I" receives a "personal benefit"78
(e.g., feeling better off because "B-2" is better off79 ).
If "B-i", the insider/tipper, is liable, "B-i's" tippee ("B-2") may also be
liable if the tippee trades and knows or should know of "B-i's" (the in-
sider/tipper's) breach of duty. The trading tippee may be a participant
after the fact in "B-l's" rule lOb-5 violation. 80
78. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-64 (stating that insider's tip is breach of fiduciary
duty if insider personally benefits); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8.1., at
336-37, 5.2.8.3, at 338-40 (describing "personal benefit" test for insider/tipper lia-
bility); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8.1, at 174, 5.2.8.3, at 176-77
(same).
79. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 ("The elements of fiduciary duty and exploita-
tion of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confiden-
tial information to a relative or friend."); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3,
at 338-40 (discussing how to demonstrate tipper's personal benefit); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 176-77 (same).
80. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-661, 662 (discussing trading tippees as "partici-
pants after the fact" and the "know or should know" test); INSIDER TRADING, supra
note 1, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at 344-46 (same); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1,
§§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at 181-83 (same).
For discussion of the "classical relationship" theory and nontrading tippees
who tip others, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.3.3, at 346-47.
[Vol. 45: p. 27
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss1/11
STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING
For rule lOb-5 misappropriation, tipper and tippee liability is similar
to that under the "classical relationship" theory. Oversimplifying some-
what, if trading (and failing to disclose the trade in advance) would breach
a duty to the information source, then tipping for a "personal benefit"
(and failing to disclose the tip in advance to the information source) also
constitutes rule 10b-5 misappropriation. 8 1 Again oversimplifying, a trad-
ing tippee may participate after the fact in the misappropriating tipper's
violation if the tippee knows or should know of the tipper's breach of
duty.8 2
F. A Difficult Issue in "Classical Relationship" Tipper/Tippee Liability:
Selective Disclosure to Analysts
One difficult issue in "classical relationship" tipper/tippee liability is se-
lective disclosure to analysts. Suppose Ms. Tycoon is the president of a
company. An analyst of a stockbrokerage firm has given her company
favorable coverage in the past and may do so in the future.
Ms. Tycoon gives the analyst material, nonpublic information about
her company one day before the public announcement. She intends that
the analyst's firm trade and tip its favorite clients. Assume that Ms. Ty-
coon, the president, is authorized to act for the corporation when tipping.
For discussion of the "classical relationship" theory and remote tippees who
trade or tip, see id. § 5.3.5, at 350-54; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.3.5,
at 183-86.
For discussion of the "classical relationship" theory and an evil-hearted out-
sider/tippee with a pure-hearted insider/tipper, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,§ 5.3.4, at 347-50.
81. Cf INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.3, at 381-83 (discussing whether
misappropriation doctrine requires that tipper receive personal benefit and citing
some cases supporting this proposition); INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1,
§ 5.4.3, at 212-13 (same). But see SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dictum) (stating that misappropriation doctrine does not require
showing of "personal benefit" to tipper); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dictum) (same). But cf. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596,
600 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that misappropriating tipper can violate rule 10b-5
even if he or she does not specifically know that his or her leak would lead to
tippee trading; this holding may suggest that plaintiff or prosecutor need not
demonstrate personal benefit in misappropriation cases).
82. Cf INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 383-85 (discussing whether
"know or should know" test applies to misappropriation and mentioning cases dis-
cussing this proposition); INSIDER TRADING SUP., supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 214-15
(same). But see United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Rule lOb-
5 requires that the defendant [tippee of a misappropriator] subjectively believe
that the information received was obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty.") (citing
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
For discussion of the liability of remote tippees of a misappropriator, see IN-
SIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.6, at 387-89; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§ 5.4.6, at 217-21.
For discussion of a misappropriating tipper's liability when the tippee trades
but is not liable, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.5, at 385-89; INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.5, at 216-17.
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The analyst's firm does exactly what Ms. Tycoon intends. It transacts
for its own account and tips favorite clients, who trade massive amounts of
stock.
Has anyone violated rule lOb-5? In my opinion, the answer is yes.83
Nevertheless, many, if not most commentators, say there is no violation. 84
The analyst and the stockbrokerage firm are not in the "classical relation-
ship" triangle. They have breached no duty to the information source
(Ms. Tycoon's company); so there is also no misappropriation.
Is the corporation liable for tipping? The corporation has a "classical
relationship" with its own shareholders.8 5 It cannot trade its own shares
based on material, nonpublic information. 86 If corporate trading would
violate rule 10b-5, corporate tipping for a "personal benefit" is also
illegal. 87
Many commentators, however, feel that a corporation can never re-
ceive a "personal benefit." Only human beings can have a "personal bene-
fit." Therefore, the corporation is not liable.8 8
I disagree. A corporation, as an entity, can obtain reciprocal benefits
by tipping analysts and others. A corporation, as an entity, can receive an
improper "personal benefit." If the corporation is liable for tipping, its
tippees may also be liable as participants after the fact.89
Dictum in Dirks v. SEC90 may suggest a reluctance to regulate analysts'
use of material nonpublic information because analysts help to preserve a
83. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302-05 (arguing that
issuer should be liable whenever it selectively discloses material nonpublic infor-
mation about itself with expectation that recipient will trade on tip); INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-61 (same).
84. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302 n.83 (citing sources
that suggest that issuer tips are lawful, even if they result in trading advantage for
recipient); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153 n.83 (same).
85. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 297-302 (explaining that
issuer has "classical relationship" with its shareholders); INSIDER TRADING SuPP.,
supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 152-53 (same).
86. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 297-302 (stating that
issuer violates rule lob-5 by trading its own stock based on material nonpublic
information); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 152-53 (same).
87. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302-05 (arguing that
liability should result when tipping corporation gains improper personal benefit);
INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-61 (same). For discussion
of the "personal benefit" test for insider/tippers under the "classical relationship"
theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43; INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 174-81; supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
88. Some of these commentators are cited in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 5.2.3.3(b), at 302 n.83; INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-
54.
89. For discussion of the tippee's participation after the fact in the tipper's
violation under the "classical relationship" theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note
1, §§ 5.3.1, 5.3.2, at 344-46; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at
181-83; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely
because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an in-
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"healthy market."9 1 Commentators disagree on the significance of this
dictum.9
2
In any event, this is an unsettled area of the law. Without addressing
when selective disclosure violates rule lOb-5, the SEC has proposed a rule
designed to prevent publicly traded companies from selectively disclosing
material nonpublic information. 93
sider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the roles of the market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market.") (footnote omitted).
91. See id. at 657-58 & nn.16-18 (recognizing value of analysts in ferreting out
and analyzing information and preserving healthy market); see also INSIDER TRAD-
ING, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.6, at 316 & n.139 (discussing this dictum in Dirks); INSIDER
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 155-56 n.87 (same).
92. See sources cited in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.3.6, at 316 &
n.139; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.3.6, at 165-66 n.139. Cf 130
CONG. REc. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (anticipat-
ing that courts will be careful "to avoid unduly inhibiting traders from generating
and acting upon valid research information of the sort upon which efficient mar-
kets necessarily depend"); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 8. SECURITIES REG. 3590,
3609 (3d ed. 1991) (describing dictum from Dirks as "paean to the analyst"); Don-
ald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REv.
1023, 1037-54 (1990) (questioning special treatment given to analysts under in-
sider trading rules); Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concern-
ing Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120-24 (1985) (criticizing special
treatment of analysts).
93. On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed Regulation FD (Fair Disclo-
sure), which provides in part:
§ 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an is-
suer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic
information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person or per-
sons outside the issuer, the issuer shall:
(1) In the case of an intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of
that information simultaneously; and
(2) In the case of non-intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of
that information promptly.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply when a disclosure is
made to a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer
(including, for example, an outside consultant such as an attorney, invest-
ment banker, or accountant) or to a person who has expressly agreed to
maintain such information in confidence.
§ 243.101 Definitions
For purposes of this Regulation FD (§ 243.101), the following definitions
shall apply:
(a) Intentional. A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information
is "intentional" when the individual making the disclosure either knew
prior to the disclosure, or was reckless in not knowing, that he or she
would be communicating information that was material and nonpublic.
(b) Issuer. Every issuer having securities registered pursuant to Section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or which is
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), including closed-end investment compa-
nies (as defined in Section 5(a) (2) of the Investment Company Act of
1940) (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(a) (2)) but not including other investment compa-
nies, shall be subject to this Regulation.
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G. Concluding Comments
Section 10(b) and SEC rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 are only some of the
federal statutes and regulations governing insider trading and tipping. As
(c) Person acting on behalf of an issuer. Any officer, director, employee,
or agent of an issuer, who discloses material nonpublic information while
acting within the scope of his or her authority, shall be considered to be a
"person acting on behalf of the issuer." An officer, director, employee, or
agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer shall not be consid-
ered to be acting on behalf of the issuer.
(d) Promptly.
(1) "Promptly" shall mean disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable
(but in no event more than 24 hours) after a senior official of the issuer
(or, in the case of a closed-end investment company, a senior' official of
the issuer's investment advisor) knows, or is reckless in not knowing, of
the non-intentional disclosure.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a "senior official"
means any director, any executive officer (as defined in § 240.3b-7 of this
chapter), any investor relations or public relations officer, or any other
person with similar functions.
(e) Public Disclosure.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (e) (2) of this section, an issuer shall
make the "public disclosure" of information required by § 243.100(a) of
this chapter by filing with the Commission a Form 8-K (17 CFR 249.308)
disclosing that information, or if the issuer is a foreign private issuer it
shall file a Form 6-K (17 CFR 249.306).
(2) An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to file a Form 8-K or
Form 6-K if it instead does one of the following:
(i) Disseminates a press release containing that information through a
widely circulated news or wire service; or
(ii) Disseminates the information through any other method of disclo-
sure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the
information and does not exclude any members of the public from ac-
cess, such as announcement at a press conference to which the public is
granted access (e.g., by personal attendance or by telephonic or other
electronic transmission).
SEC Rel. Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209, File No. S7-31-99 (Dec. 20, 1999), 1999
WL 1217849, *38-*39 (S.E.C.), available in <www.sec.gov./rules/proposed/34-
42259.htm.>. For the text of the entire proposed rule, see 1999 WL 1217849 at
*37-40.
In its release accompanying the proposed regulation, the Commission noted
that it was not addressing the insider trading issues raised in Dirks but instead was
proposing adoption of Regulation FD under its authority to require disclosure by
issuers, primarily under Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1999). See
1999 WL 1217849 at *6.
For additional discussion of the proposed Regulation FD, see 1999 WL
1217849, at *2-17, *27-30, *32-35.
For description of a possible leak to at least one analyst in advance of the
public announcement and a brief discussion of the pressure to leak and the legal
issues, see Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy Over Possible Leak of
Sluggish Sales Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at C1.
On December 20, 1999, the Commission also proposed rule 10b5-I and rule
10b5-2, dealing with various aspects of insider trading regulation. For discussion of
these two rules, see supra note 66.
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briefly mentioned earlier,9 4 federal mail/wire fraud is an important
weapon in criminal prosecutions of insider trading defendants. 9 5 Con-
gress, the SEC and the courts have built a complicated patchwork of laws
and regulations to deal with the problem of insider trading. A complete
description is beyond the scope of this Article. 96
V. UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAw, WHAT ARE SOME REMEDIES AND
SANCTIONs AGAINST A STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADER OR TIPPER?
Under federal securities law, who can bring a private civil action
against a stock market insider trader or tipper? Again, I shall rely on the
generic defect used car hypothetical. 97
Suppose a federal statute provides: "Thou shalt not commit fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a used automobile." Further as-
sume that the law creates a private cause of action. Who should be able to
sue Greedie under the statute? At least three alternatives exist.98
First, the courts could hold that Greedie's sale triggered a duty to
disclose to some larger group of 1998 Cadillac buyers. An example of
such a group would be all those buying 1998 Cadillacs around the same
time as Greedie's sale.99 (An even larger possible group would be all those
buying between the time of his sale and public disclosure of the defect).10 0
94. See supra text accompanying note 74.
95. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11, at 733-60 (discussing application
of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to insider trading and tipping); INSIDER
TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 11, at 345-63 (same).
Thus far, the courts have not explored the insider trader's mail/wire fraud
duty to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade. Under this unexamined
obligation, a stock market insider trader might conceivably have a duty to disclose
to the party on the other side even in the absence of a "classical relationship." For
discussion of the insider trader's possible mail/fraud duty to disclose to the party
on the other side of the trade, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2; IN-
SIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2, at 361-63. For discussion of the rule
10b-5 "classical relationship" theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3,
at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3, at 144-86; supra notes
57-65 and accompanying text.
96. For discussion of the federal law regulating insider trading, see INSIDER
TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-6.14, at 119-546, 9.1-12.4, at 685-806, 15.1-15.12, at
993-1103; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 4.1-6.14, at 35-264, 9.1-12.3.2 at
321-91, 15.1-15.11.4 at 603-38.
97. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see supra Part I.
98. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.9, at 484-87 (discussing four alterna-
tives in context of stock market insider trading (variants of three following
alternatives)).
99. See id. §§ 6.5, at 444-55, 6.9 at 485-86 (discussing contemporaneous trader
plaintiffs against stock market insider trader); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§ 6.5, at 245-46 (same).
100. Cf Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding liability to "not only the purchasers of the actual shares
sold by the defendants (in the unlikely event they can be identified) but to all
persons who during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market
without knowledge of the material inside information which was in the possession
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This is a bootstrap means of artificially manufacturing fraud and can
lead to absurdly large civil liability. Greedie would be liable for the losses
of all those throughout the world who bought a 1998 Cadillac around the
time of his sale (or between his sale and public disclosure). The sum of all
these losses might be huge.
To avoid that result, Greedie's total liability could be limited to the
amount of his profit, or loss avoided. Suppose he sold his car for $25,000,
and the price fell to $15,000 after the public announcement. His profit,
or loss avoided, would be $10,000. That $10,000 could be spread among
all those buying 1998 Cadillacs around the same time as his sale (or all
those buying between the time of Greedie's sale and public disclosure).
This spreading could result in each plaintiff receiving a trivial amount.
Second, the courts could hold that the only private civil plaintiffs al-
lowed are those who can demonstrate harm from Greedie's sale itself.10 '
This would require that the plaintiff demonstrate that he or she is the pre-
empted seller or the induced buyer harmed by Greedie's act of selling.
10 2
Such parties may be the most appropriate private civil plaintiffs; but, in
practice, these victims are not identifiable. Consequently, no private civil
plaintiff could sue.
Third, the courts could allow a suit by the party on the other side of
the trade, the dealer. 10 3 The courts could conclusively presume harm,
even when it is absent.
Under United States securities law, who can sue a stock market insider
trader or tipper? Congress has granted "contemporaneous traders" an ex-
press private cause of action against insider traders and tippers who violate
federal securities law.
10 4
of the defendants"); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,377, at 98,877-78 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (holding defendants liable to all purchasers of Douglas stock from time of
first illegal insider sale to full public disclosure); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§§ 6.5.2, at 446-47, 6.9, at 484-85 (discussing two Shapiro opinions); INSIDER TRAD-
INC SuPP., supra note 1, § 6.5.2, at 245 (same); Veronica M. Dougherty, A
[Dis]semblance of Privity: Criticizing the Contemporaneous Trader Requirement in Insider
Trading, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 86, 116-22, 139-43 (1999) (arguing that plaintiff
class against stock market trader should include all those who traded between time
of inside trade and public disclosure); William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Non-
public Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217, 1256-62, 1282-83 (1981) (discussing
two Shapiro opinions); see also Dougherty, supra, at 97-101 (discussing Second Cir-
cuit opinion in Shapiro).
101. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 6.6, at 455-65, 6.9, at 486 (discuss-
ing plaintiffs who can demonstrate harm from act of insider trading); INSIDER
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.6, at 246 (same).
102. See supra Part II (discussing induced and preempted traders).
103. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 6.7, at 465-79, 6.9, at 486 (discuss-
ing plaintiffs on other side of stock market insider trade); INSIDER TRADING SUPP.,
supra note 1, § 6.7, at 246-50 (same).
104. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994), re-
printed in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 397 n.2; INSIDER TRADING, supra
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"Contemporaneous" roughly means "around the same time."'10 5 If
the defendant purchases or tips someone who buys, the "contemporaneous
traders" would be sellers of the same stock between the precise time of the
insider trade and shortly thereafter. 10 6 If the defendant sells or tips some-
one who sells, the "contemporaneous traders" would be buyers of the same
stock between the precise time of the insider trade and shortly
thereafter. 10 7
In this express cause of action, the insider trader's total liability to
these "contemporaneous traders" is limited to the insider trader's profit or
loss avoided (minus any amounts paid by the defendant in an equitable
action for disgorgement' 0 8 brought by the SEC). ° 9 A tipper is liable
jointly and severally with those "to whom the communication was
directed."1 10
"Contemporaneous" traders are not necessarily the victims of the act
of insider trading (as opposed to the accompanying nondisclosure). The
real victim might be an induced trader who transacted well after the in-
sider trade (but before public disclosure). The real victim might be a pre-
empted trader, someone who did not trade at all. 11
Nevertheless, Congress' solution does manage to create private civil
plaintiffs. Congress' approach also enables a class action.
note 1, § 6.2, at 395-99 (discussing § 20A; INSIDER TRADING SupP., supra note 1,
§ 6.2, at 223-28 (same)).
For discussion of whether "contemporaneous" traders have both an express
and an implied cause of action for damages against stock market insider trading
defendants, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 400-12; INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 228-32.
105. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.4, at 412-15 (discussing case law
defining "contemporaneous"); INSIDER TRADING SupP., supra note 1, § 6.4, at 232-
45 (same).
106. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 415-17, 6.4.2, at 418-30
(discussing judicial interpretations of meaning of "contemporaneous"); INSIDER
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 232-33, 6.4.2, at 233-37 (same).
107. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 415-17, 6.4.2, at 418-30
(discussing judicial interpretation of meaning of "contemporaneous"); INSIDER
TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 232-33, 6.4.2, at 233-37 (same).
For an argument in favor of abandoning the "contemporaneous" requirement
and allowing suit by all opposite-type traders from the time of the insider trade to
public disclosure, see Dougherty, supra note 100, at 86, 116-22, 139-43.
108. For discussion of the SEC's power to seek disgorgement, see INSIDER
TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 571-80; INSIDER TRADING SupP., supra note 1,
§ 7.3.2, at 286-94; John H. Sturc & Russell T. Goin, Disgorgement: A Primer, 32 REv.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 153 (1999).
109. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 398 & n.5 (describing § 20A's
ceiling on damages).
110. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(c)
(1994), reprinted in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 397-98 n.2 (providing
that individual who communicates inside information is liable jointly and severally
with person "to whom the communication was directed"). For discussion of
§ 20A(c), see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 399; INSIDER TRADING SUPP.,
supra note 1, § 6.2, at 224.
111. See supra Part II (discussing induced and preempted traders).
2000]
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The statutory cause of action for "contemporaneous traders" specifi-
cally states that it does not supplant any other implied private cause of
action the courts create. 112 I think that the courts would also allow the
party on the other side of the transaction to sue, at least for rescission.
113
Indeed, § 20A of the Securities Exchange Act itself may create an express
statutory cause of action for rescission by the party on the other side of the
insider trade. 1 4 In my opinion, the party in privity with the insider trader
may also bring an implied action for damages against a defendant liable
under the "classical relationship" theory.
115
It is even possible that contemporaneous traders might be able simul-
taneously to bring two causes of action for damages against an insider trad-
ing defendant. The first action would be an express one under the
statute. The second claim would be an implied cause of action under SEC
rule 10b-5. 1
16
Private civil remedies are not the only sanctions against a stock mar-
ket insider trader or tipper who violates federal securities law. The SEC
can go to court to obtain various forms of civil relief and civil penalties
against stock market insider traders and tippers who violate the law, 117
including either or both of the following:
112. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(d)
(1994), reprinted in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 397-98 n.2 ("Nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to
bring an action to enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any cause
of action implied from a provision of this title."). For discussion of § 20A(d), see
INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 4.9.1, at 259 n.15 and accompanying text, 4.9.2,
at 270 n.47, 6.3, at 405-10 & nn.22, 24, 26, 36-40, 50, 6.8, at 479-84; INSIDER TRAD-
ING SUP"., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 229-32, § 6.8, at 250-51.
113. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.9, at 248-77 (discussing rescission
as remedy against stock market insider trader); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note
1, § 4.9, at 139-42.
114. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.9.4, at 273-76 (discussing whether
§ 20A creates statutory cause of action for recission); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra
note 1, § 4.9.4, at 142 (same).
115. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.8, at 479-84 (discussing whether
§ 20A precludes party on other side of insider trade from bringing implied action
for damages against someone liable under "classical relationship" theory); INSIDER
TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.8, at 250-51 (same).
116. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 400-12 (discussing whether
contemporaneous traders have both express and implied action for damages); IN-
SIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 228-32 (same).
Allowing contemporaneous traders both an implied and an express action for
damages would still not make the plaintiffs whole if, with both claims, the insider
trading profit is spread pro rata among the members of the plaintiff class. Even
after recovery of damages under both causes of action, each plaintiff would receive
only a small portion of his or her actual loss. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1,
§ 6.3, at 401-02 & nn.6-9; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 229.
117. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 564-614 (detailing enforce-
ment remedies available to SEC); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.3, at
281-317 (same).
[Vol. 45: p. 27
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss1/11
2000] STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING 63
(1) disgorgement1 8 of the profit (or loss avoided) for the benefit of so-
called "victims" (generally contemporaneous opposite-type traders)' 19;
(2) up to three times the profit (or loss avoided) for payment as a civil
penalty to the United States Treasury. 120
In addition to the civil remedies and penalties obtainable by the SEC,
the Justice Department can seek criminal penalties for stock market in-
sider traders and tippers who violate federal law. 12 1 In short, the SEC and
the Justice Department may ask a court to impose on a stock market in-
sider trading defendant a variety of equitable remedies, civil penalties, and
criminal sanctions. 12 2
VI. SUMMARY
A. Is the Act of Stock Market Insider Trading a Victimless Crime?
Each act of stock market insider trading has specific, although anony-
mous, victims. This Article employed two used car analogies: the solitary
defect hypothetical and the generic defect hypothetical.
In the solitary defect example, Mr. Greedie owns a 1998 Cadillac and
discovers that his particular automobile has a major defect. He goes to a
dealer and sells it. Greedie either lies to the dealer or fails to disclose the
flaw. The dealer discovers the defect and is stuck with the faulty car.
In the solitary defect hypothetical, only one automobile is a lemon.
In contrast, in the generic defect situation, many individuals are buying
and selling cars, all the same year model and all with the same defect.
The generic defect example resembles stock market insider trading,
especially large block trades between an institutional investor and a block
positioner. Such block transactions have aspects of face-to-face dealing.
In the generic defect hypothetical, Mr. Greedie, an executive em-
ployed by General Motors, receives material, nonpublic information that
all 1998 Cadillacs have a major defect. By coincidence, Greedie personally
118. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 571-80 (discussing SEC ob-
tained disgorgement of ill-gotten profits); INSIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1,
§ 7.3.2, at 286-94 (same); Sturc & Goin, supra note 108, at 154, 157 (discussing
SEC's power to seek disgorgement from insider trading defendants).
119. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 571 n.32 (discussing to
whom disgorgement of insider trading profits is awarded).
120. See id. § 7.3.3, at 581-89 (discussing civil monetary penalty obtainable in
court by SEC); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.3.3, at 294-99 (same). For
a discussion of the civil monetary penalty that the court may impose on a "control-
ling person" of someone who engages in illegal insider trading or tipping, see
INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7.3.3, at 582 n.52, 588-89, 13.2.2, at 813-19; IN-
SIDER TRADING SuPP., supra note 1 §§ 7.3.3, at 296, 13.2.2, at 398.
121. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7.1.2, at 549, 7.2, at 552-64 (discuss-
ing criminal liability for securities fraud and for insider trading); INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 7.2, at 269-81.
122. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7, at 547-672 (discussing govern-
ment enforcement against securities fraud and insider trading); INSIDER TRADING
Supp., supra note 1, § 7, at 265-317 (same).
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owns a 1998 Cadillac and immediately sells it to a car dealer. (Assume in
the alternative that (1) the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect,
or (2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.) During
the period between Greedie's sale and the time of the defect's public an-
nouncement, many individuals are buying and selling 1998 Cadillacs, all
with the same defect.
At the time of the defect's announcement, there are a fixed number
of 1998 Cadillacs. If Greedie has one less Cadillac at the time of the public
announcement, someone else must have one more. That someone is the
victim of Greedie's sale. I call this "the law of conservation of used
automobiles."
If Greedie's sale of one car on inside information to the automobile
dealer causes even a slight lowering of the dealer's prices for 1998 Cadil-
lacs, that decline may dissuade or induce a transaction. If the dealer's
prices do not change (or if the price declines fail to dissuade or induce a
trade), the loss falls on the car dealer (an induced buyer). Under the "law
of conservation of used automobiles," Greedie's sale must induce a
purchase or preempt a sale.
In order to identify the victim, one must determine the prices the
dealer would have charged absent Greedie's sale. Then, one must ascer-
tain how the public would have reacted to these prices. This information
is unknowable.
The generic defect used car analogy demonstrates two points. First,
each act of insider trading has one or more particular victims. Second,
these victims are anonymous. They exist, but, practically, cannot be
identified.
The "law of conservation of used automobiles" is similar to the "law of
conservation of securities" and stock market insider trading. Assume that
the outstanding number of shares of a company remains constant between
the time of the insider trade and public disclosure. Let us focus on the
shares outstanding at the time of public disclosure.
With an insider purchase of stock, the insider has more of that issue at
public disclosure. Someone else must have less. That someone is worse
off because of the insider trade.
With an insider sale of shares, the insider has less of that issue at pub-
lic disclosure. Someone else must have more. That someone is worse off
because of the insider trade.
The "law of conservation of securities" shows that each stock market
insider trade must induce an adverse trade and/or preempt an advanta-
geous transaction. The price move after public disclosure enriches the
insider trader. This gain (or loss avoided) corresponds to the loss (or gain
avoided) of the induced and/or preempted trader. Society's antipathy to-
wards stock market insider trading is based on the unjust enrichment of
the insider trader at the cost of the anonymous victims of the trade.
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The law of conservation of securities demonstrates that the insider
trade is a but-for cause of injury to specific victims. Whether the insider
trade is a proximate cause of harm is a separate issue.' 23 Nevertheless, if
the insider trade is not even a but-for cause of injury, liability is much less
likely.
If the public becomes aware of insider trading, the prices of stocks
generally may decline (although estimating the risk would be difficult). If
the employees of a particular corporation acquire a reputation for trading
on nonpublic information, that specific company's stock may decrease in
price. Such declines would increase the cost of capital of particular companies or of
publicly traded corporations generally.
Ex ante, these price decreases might partially compensate new buyers
for the risk of being victims of stock market insider trading (although, as
mentioned earlier, estimating the risk would be difficult). Even ex ante,
frequent traders definitely suffer harm from insider trading. The risk of
injury from insider trading varies with the frequency of one's trades or
"near trades." (Ex post, victims of a stock market insider trade are dispro-
portionately injured even if they originally purchased their stock at a price
that accurately reflected the possibility of insider trading.)
Because market-makers transact so often, they are especially exposed
to the risk of harm from insider trading (although they may sometimes
pass the injury to others prior to disclosure by altering prices and thereby
readjusting inventory to the level preferred). Ex ante, the presence of in-
sider trading may cause specialists and market-makers to widen their
spreads to compensate for the risk of becoming a victim. This increase in
spreads would harm all public trading investors, but especially those who
trade often. Again, ex ante, frequent traders would bear the brunt of the
injury from insider trading. In addition, the increase in bid-ask spreads
may deter investors from trading and thereby decrease the liquidity of the
market.
As with pornography, whether insider trading has victims, affects, but
does not resolve the question of how strictly to regulate it. A full discus-
sion of the arguments for and against regulation is beyond the scope of
this Article. 12 4
B. Is Stock Market Insider Trading Fraud?
Stock market insider trading has some features of fraud, but differs
from traditional fraud in several ways. Disclosure to the party on the other
side or to the public may breach other duties. Also, such disclosure would
123. For discussion of when insider trading or tipping violates federal securi-
ties law, see supra Part IV text and notes 50-96. This part is summarized below
under the question, "When Does Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping Violate Federal
Securities Law?'
124. For an extensive discussion of the arguments for and against regulation
of stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 2.1-3.6, at 13-
117; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 2.1-3.5.1, at 3-34.
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not save the victim of the insider trade if the victim is a preempted trader.
Whether a court classifies insider trading as fraud depends in part on
whether the court is judicially conservative or activist.
C. When Does Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping Violate Federal
Securities Law?
Despite the differences between stock market insider trading and
traditional fraud, the United States Supreme Court has endorsed two ba-
ses of insider trading liability under rule lOb-5: the "classical relationship"
theory and the misappropriation doctrine. Rather than focus on the vic-
tims of the act of trading, the Court has focused on the victims of certain
independent disclosure duties. These independent duties are breached by
the nondisclosure that accompanies the stock market insider trade.
The "classical relationship" is a triangle involving (1) the issuer, (2)
the insider trader/tipper and (3) the shareholder on the other side of the
insider trade.1 25 An employee or independent contractor of a company
has a "classical relationship" with a corporate shareholder by virtue of a
mutual relationship to the company. This relationship imposes a duty on
the employee or independent contractor to disclose material, nonpublic
information to the shareholder on the other side of the transaction.
The court treats the "classical relationship" as analogous to the soli-
tary defect used car hypothetical. In reality, however, such stock market
insider trading is comparable to the generic defect used car hypothetical.
The Court might respond as follows. Although the party on the other
side of the stock market insider trade is not necessarily the victim of the act
of insider trading, the party in privity is the victim of the nondisclosure ac-
companying the insider trade that breaches the independent duty to dis-
close created by the "classical relationship."
Under the misappropriation doctrine, stock market insider trading or
tipping violates rule lOb-5 when the trade or tip breaches a fiduciary duty
to the information source (e.g., a direct or indirect employer), and the
trader or tipper fails to disclose this breach to the information source
before transacting.
The "classical relationship" and misappropriation theories cover,
most, but not all, insider trading and tipping. This summary discusses
only some of the federal statutes and SEC rules governing insider trading
and tipping. Congress, the SEC and the courts have built a complex
patchwork of laws and regulations to address the problem.
125. See supra Figure 4, at notes 58, 77 for a diagram of the "classical relation-
ship" triangle.
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D. Under Federal Securities Laws, What Are Some Remedies and Sanctions
Against a Stock Market Insider Trader or Tipper?
In theory, the most appropriate private civil plaintiffs against a stock
market insider trader or tipper might be the victims of the act of trading,
the preempted and/or induced traders. In practice, however, these vic-
tims are not identifiable.
As a solution, Congress has granted "contemporaneous traders" an
express private cause of action against insider traders and tippers who vio-
late federal securities law. The real victims of the trade may not be in this
class.
The statutory cause of action for "contemporaneous traders" specifi-
cally states that it does not supplant any other implied private cause of
action the courts create. In my opinion, the courts would allow a party on
the other side of an illegal insider trade to sue for rescission and for dam-
ages against a defendant liable under the "classical relationship" theory. 126
It is even possible that "contemporaneous traders" might be able simulta-
neously to bring both an express and an implied cause of action for dam-
ages against an insider trading defendant. 127
Remedies in private suits are not the only sanctions against a stock
market insider trader or tipper who violates federal law. The SEC and the
Justice Department may go to court to impose on a stock market insider
trader or tipper a variety of equitable remedies, civil penalties and crimi-
nal sanctions.
126. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing rescission of
illegal insider trade).
127. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing whether contem-
poraneous traders have both express and implied action for damages).
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